Bellona Report nr. 2:96. Written by: Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik and Alexandr Nikitin.
The Russian Northern Fleet
The Northern Fleet
Table of Contents
[NFL Updated]
[On to nuclear-powered vessels]
[Back to introduction]
[References]
[Content]
The White Sea and the Barents Sea have been of importance to the Russian
merchant fleet ever since the 15th century. The matter of access to ice free
harbours in the north became of increasing importance after Germany became a
significant naval power in the Baltic Sea. In 1895, construction began on a
modern harbour in Aleksandrovsk (present day Polyarny) at the mouth of the
Murmansk Fjord. The port was completed in 1899.[8]
Events during World War I increased the strategic importance of the Kola
Peninsula to Russia. The Kola Peninsula and the White sea played an important
role in the transfer of military supplies to Russia, especially after the German
conquest of the coastal areas as far as Estonia during World War I. A naval
force dedicated especially to the northern region was established shortly after
the outbreak of World War I. When the railway to Murmansk was opened in 1917,
the rest of Russia was thereby connected to a ice free port which was open all
year. The Soviet Fleet of the Northern Seas was established as a result of
Joseph Stalin's visit to Polyarny during the summer of 1933.[9] In 1937, it was renamed the Northern Fleet. Prior
to the outbreak of World War II, the Northern Fleet consisted of eight
destroyers, 15 diesel-powered submarines, a formation of patrol boats, mine
sweepers and some smaller vessels.[10]
During the Russian involvement in World War II (1941-1945), the harbours and
ports on the Kola Peninsula were of great importance to the Soviet Union. The
Murmansk Convoys carried large amounts of materiel and supplies
from the western allies to Murmansk. Supplies were transported via railroad to
assist the Russian war effort to the south. During the war, the Northern Fleet
was given several new ships as well as having vessels transferred from other
Soviet fleets. However, most of these were lost during the war.
By the close of the war, the United States Navy had become considerably
larger and more powerful than that of the Soviet Union. In order to catch up
with the American head start, the Soviet Union began to build a large naval
force of its own. The build-up of a modern fleet on the Kola Peninsula began
towards the end of the 1950s. World War II use of submarines had shown the
tactical and strategic possibilities of this weapon to advantage. However, the
diesel submarines were severely handicapped in their inability to remain
permanently submerged. This necessitates spending long periods on the surface,
running the dieselengines in order to charge the batteries which powered the
vessel when submerged.
The decision to develop and build nuclear submarines therefore constituted
an important strategic turning point for the Soviet Navy, and the resolution to
pursue this course was adopted by the Supreme Soviet on December 21, 1952.[11] In 1954, the first American nuclear submarine
USS Nautilus was commissioned. Construction of the first Soviet
nuclear submarine K-3 Leninsky Komsomol began in Molotovsk (now
known as Severodvinsk) on September 24, 1955. The submarine was launched on
August 9, 1957, and it was commissioned to the Northern Fleet on July 1, 1958.
On July 3, she sailed out into the White Sea, and her reactors were started up
for the first time on July 4, 1958. The submarine sailed to her base at Malaya
Lopatka in Severomorsk-7 (now known as Zapadnaya Litsa) at which she would be
stationed. In the period from 1950 to 1970, the Northern Fleet grew from having
been the smallest to the largest and most important of the four Soviet fleets.[12] Six new naval bases some with nuclear submarine
facilities were built on the Kola Peninsula from Zapadnaya Litsa in the west to
Gremikha in the east. A number of smaller navy bases for other types of vessels
were also established at the Pechenga Fjord in the west, Belomorsk to the east
and Novaya Zemlya to the north. At the same time, five large naval yards were
built on the Kola Peninsula and in Severodvinsk for the construction and
maintenance of nuclear submarines. It was not long before the size of the Soviet
fleet of nuclear submarines had surpassed that of the United States, with about
two thirds of all Soviet submarines based with the Northern Fleet.
Since 1958, there have been four generations of nuclear submarines and a
number of nuclear-powered experimental submarines. The nuclear submarines are
built at four different shipyards. By 1995, 245 nuclear submarines and four
nuclear-powered surface ships had been delivered to the Navy. Two thirds of
these vessels were delivered to the Northern Fleet, whereas only one third of
the nuclear submarines were destined for the Pacific Fleet.[13] The first nuclear submarines to be assigned to
the Pacific Fleet were delivered in 1961.[14]
Nuclear submarines have never been assigned to the other two fleets of the
Soviet Union, the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Sea Fleet. During the entire
Soviet period, the expenses of the Navy were always covered by the state, and
the Northern Fleet never had to contend with economic difficulties or problems
in financing new projects.
The commander in chief of the Russian Navy is Chief Commander Feliks N.
Gromov. The commander in chief of the Northern Fleet is Admiral Oleg A.
Yerofeev. The Northern Fleet is organised into departments, each of which has a
special area of responsibility. For example, the Technical Department with its
offices in the Rosta district of Murmansk is responsible for day to day storage
of nuclear waste and for the security of the nuclear submarines at Kola, whether
in service or inactive.
The Russian Navy is responsible for the nuclear submarines as long as they
are in active service or are moored at one of the Northern Fleet's naval bases.
The Navy is also responsible for the three shipyards that service and maintain
the nuclear submarines. Otherwise, the state committee for the defence industry
(Goskomoboronprom) is in charge of the other shipyards. The
Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) is responsible for
the nuclear fuel that is used in the naval reactors, from the delivery of new
fuel to the base to the receipt and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The
Russian Ministry of Transport is responsible for the freight of new and spent
nuclear fuel by railroad.
In addition to the organisations mentioned above, there are a number of
other state organisations and ministries which are responsible for ensuring that
prescribed procedures are adhered to and correctly executed. The Ministry of
Environment, the Ministry of Public Health, the Radiation Protection Authority
Gosatomnadzor and the state committee for monitoring the public
health along with the Ministry of Defence are responsible for working out
nuclear safety regulations on board Navy vessels and storage/processing
facilities for radioactive waste. The Ministry of Defence's internal regulatory
authority is responsible for ensuring that these regulations are adhered to. In
earlier years, Gosatomnadzor had partial responsibility for
monitoring nuclear safety at the naval bases. (See Chapter 4).
The Ministry for Situations of Emergencies is charged with averting and
mitigating disasters.
In later years, a number of semi-private commercial companies have also
appeared, especially in work entailing the dismantling of obsolete submarines
and other naval vessels.
The Russian Northern Fleet has undergone some significant changes since
1989. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and extensive
political reforms and changes in Russia came the end of the Cold War. There have
been numerous disarmament agreements between the United States and Russia,
including the START I and START II treaties. Military doctrine in both countries
has changed, and a large part of the original military industrial complex is in
the process of converting to civilian free-market production. The number of
strategic submarines and nuclear warheads has been reduced, and the numbers will
probably continue to decrease in the years ahead.
The year 1989 was the year in which the Soviet Navy had its largest number
of nuclear submarines in operation ever - 196 in total. Now in 1996, there are
109 nuclear submarines in service, of which 67 belong to the Northern Fleet.[16] Other sources state the total of operational
nuclear submarines in the Northern Fleet to be 84.[17]
It is this latter number on which the START II treaty bases its overview for the
present year. The reason for the difference between the two figures is that a
number of nuclear submarines have been laid up without being considered actually
out of service. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, western intelligence
has always given a higher figure for the number of operational Russian nuclear
submarines than correct.[18] The number of
operational submarines in the Russian Navy will probably drop to approximately
80 by the year 2003.[19] The proportional
allotment of these submarines between the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet
is unknown, but it seems most likely that the Northern Fleet will remain the
larger of the two for the foreseeable future.
Photo.
In accordance with the START-II disarmament treaty, the number of
strategic missiles on board Northern Fleet submarines will be reduced to a total
of 1 750 by the year 2003. Most likely the number will be even smaller. Here a
strategic nuclear missile is removed from a Delta-II class submarine at a naval
base on the Kola Peninsula. Once their missiles have been removed, the nuclear
submarines are then laid up.
Due to copyright restraints this
photograph is only available in the printed version. The printed version can be
ordered from us.
Military doctrine has also changed within the Northern Fleet. Once an
ocean-going fleet of world-wide influence, its principal mission today is to
defend the Russian borders. To illustrate, the patrolling activity of the
Northern Fleet in the Atlantic Ocean today has been reduced to 20% of what it
used to be only a few years ago.[20]
Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nuclear submarines of the
Soviet Navy patrolled both the East and West Coasts of the United States, the
South China Sea and outside the Persian Gulf. Nowadays it is seldom that a
Russian nuclear submarine will patrol in any of these waters.[21] Towards the end of 1995, increased Russian
submarine activity was registered off the north-western coast of the United
States, and Project 971 - Akula class nuclear submarines were discovered in
international waters just outside the Bangor Naval Base in Washington state. In
1995 Submarines of the Akula class were also noticed off the east coast of the
United States. In the same year, Project 949 A - Oscar-II-class submarines
followed American aircraft carriers in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans on a
number of occasions.[22] At the same time,
American submarines continue to patrol close into Russian territorial waters
outside the Kola Peninsula.[23] A foreign nuclear
submarine was discovered off the Kola coast as recently as March 1996.[24]
Foto,
35 kb.
The Northern Fleet has two such nuclear powered battle cruisers, and a
third will be delivered over the course of 1996. Due to technical problems, the
battle cruisers have been laid up over the past three to four years. These
vessels are based at Severomorsk on the Murmansk Fjord.
Since 1989, the number of naval vessels in the Northern Fleet has been
reduced by 40%. In addition, numerous ships have been placed on reserve,
including a number of nuclear submarines. The number of crew has been reduced,
and the Northern Fleet staff has been reorganised.[25]
All of the first generation nuclear submarines (November, Echo, and Hotel
classes) and 60 % of the second generation vessels (Victor, Charlie, Yankee, and
Delta) classes are no longer in service. The number of surface ships in the
Northern Fleet has been dramatically reduced, but only the oldest and most worn
out of the vessels have been taken out of service altogether. According to
Russian naval authorities, there are no plans to develop any further generations
of nuclear submarines[26]. However, the fourth
generation of nuclear submarines, the Severodvinsk class, is presently under
development and will probably enter service in 1998.[27]
Large parts of the former Soviet military industry are scheduled to be
converted to civilian production, and the naval shipyards are no exception.
Construction of nuclear submarines has halted at three of the four yards that
formerly had this task. Other shipyards that used to build vessels for the navy
now lie outside Russia's borders, including the shipyards at Sevastopol,
Nikolaev, and Kerch which are all in the Ukraine. The construction of the new
nuclear-powered battle cruiser Pyotr Veliky at the Baltiyskaya
yard in St. Petersburg was postponed for several years until it finally
underwent sea trials for the first time towards the end of 1995.
The Northern Fleet lacks the funds to carry out the necessary servicing and
maintenance on its operational submarines. Subsequently, many of them remain in
port.[28] For lack of servicing, the Northern
Fleet's two nuclear-powered battle cruisers Admiral Ushakov and
Admiral Nakhimov
also remained in port for the whole of 1994 and 1995. Admiral
Ushakov has not been at sea since sustaining machine damage in 1991,
while
Admiral Nakhimov has been moored for the last three years. Both
ships are based in Severomorsk.[29] The Northern
Fleet Command asserts that the lack of maintenance on the nuclear submarines and
other naval vessels leads to an inability to fulfil the terms of the present
military doctrine.[30]
In 1994, only 35% of the funds especially earmarked for the Northern Fleet,
were actually transferred.[31] According to the
1994 budget, 600 billion roubles should have been transferred to the Northern
Fleet, but this was never actually done.[32] The
funds that were transferred went largely to pay wages and to cover social
services for Northern Fleet personnel. 1995 was an even harder year than 1994.
Due to high inflation, the Northern Fleet's entire annual budget was spent
within the first six months of the year,[33]
forcing severe cutbacks on the operation and maintenance of ships and naval
bases.[34] On several occasions, the payment of
wages was delayed, and this resulted in naval officers refusing to go to sea on
patrol duty. There have been several instances over the past two years where the
Northern Fleet was obliged to recruit officers from various neighbouring bases
in order to assemble a crew for a ship due to go out on patrol. At times, even
the nuclear submarines have been sent out on patrol without the full complement
of officers.[35] It has become quite common that
officers are not paid when they go on vacation. In 1995, the wages of naval
officers at Zapadnaya Litsa for the months of June, July and August were not
paid until September. Even now in 1996, the wages for the first months of the
year were delayed for several months.[36]
Foto,
49 kb.
Due to the Northern Fleet's considerable economic problems, crews on
board the nuclear submarines do not always receive their salaries on schedule.
On numerous occasions, nuclear submarines have been sent out on patrol without
the full complement of qualified officers.
At present, the Northern Fleet is unable to pay for the services formerly
provided by the state. Many of the companies and shipyards whose services are
directed towards the activities of the Northern Fleet receive no economic
assistance from the state either, and must try to survive according to the
economic principles of the free market. In January 1996, the Northern Fleet owed
40 billion roubles in wages to workers at the various shipyards and other
factories. The Northern Fleet's total debt to the shipyards is in the realm of
200 billion roubles.[37]
On September 21, 1995, the power company Kolenergo shut off
electricity to the naval base Gadzhievo as well as to the weapons
storagefacilities there. This action was precipitated by a long-standing unpaid
electricity bill amounting to about 4.5 million USD. Power was restored again 40
minutes later when the Northern Fleet sent armed guards to the transformer
station.[38] The Northern Fleet Command later
stated that never again would Kolenergo dare to shut off the
power.[39] On September 26, the power was again
shut off for 20 minutes, this time at the military shipyard Sevmorput.[40]
Admiral Yerofeev has suggested a number of measures by which the Northern
Fleet might earn funds and improve its economic condition until the political
situation in Russia stabilises. For example, the Northern Fleet could sell a
number of its ships to other countries and retain for itself the proceeds of the
sale. Training of the crew for these ships could also raise income for the
Northern Fleet. However, according to present rules, this kind of extra income
can only be used towards welfare or social benefits for the officers.[41]
Another way to improve the financial situation would be to permit the naval
shipyards to carry out the dismantling of naval vessels and sell the salvaged
metals for scrap. The Northern Fleet is also considering renting/leasing to
non-military research institutions engaged in scientific research in the Arctic
region. For example, in June 1995, Germany used one of the Northern Fleet's
Delta-III submarines to launch an experimental rocket. The launch took place
just outside the Gremikha naval base in the southern part of the Barents Sea.
The experimental rocket was launched from a depth of 50 meters on an RSM-50
(SS-N-18) type booster. This type of booster was originally designed to launch
nuclear warheads, but is now obsolete. The German experimental launch was the
second such venture for the Northern Fleet; the first took place in 1994. On
this occasion, the Northern Fleet worked with the Russian space centre, and was
only paid for the time that the submarine was in use. However, the Northern
Fleet was willing to accept these terms, for it presented an opportunity to
train the crew in an unusual exercise, an opportunity they would not otherwise
have had.[42]
In August 1995, a Northern Fleet Project 671 RTM submarine (Victor-III
class) was used to transport potatoes and fruit from the Kola Peninsula to the
Yamal Peninsula on the northern coast of Siberia. The missiles had been removed
from the missile compartment to increase the cargo space for potatoes.[43] The concept of using military nuclear submarines
to transport civilian cargo is under further study, thus there have been no
conclusions. The Russian Navy emphasises that the use of military vessels for
civilian commissions is only intended as a temporary stopgap in the transitional
period until the economic situation has stabilised.[44]
Other opportunities may arise with the development of the oil and gas fields
in the Arctic seas. Nuclear submarines could possibly be used in geological
studies and to transport oil. The Moscow-based company Sudoexport
has presented plans to rebuild nuclear submarines into civilian oil tankers.[45] The transport route would run from the oil
terminals along the northern coast of Siberia and Arkhangelsk County to various
oil ports. Each submarine is estimated to have a carrying capacity of 830 tons
and with a crew of 35 men. For entry into the harbours of countries that either
prohibit or do not desire visits from nuclear-powered vessels, the diesel
engines could be used inside the harbour areas. The same company has also
presented plans to rebuild nuclear submarines into civilian container ships.[46] Transport routes of particular interest are the
passages from Northern Europe to Asia. The submarine's ability to travel
submerged makes it independent of ice conditions at sea and permits an even more
rapid transit time between east and west. Potential cargo capacity is estimated
to be 20 containers with a cargo of 900 m³. Tourist cruises in the north on
board nuclear submarines have also been considered.
Illustration, 17 kb.
The company Sudoexport has developed plans to rebuild military nuclear
submarines into civilian nuclear powered container carrying submarines with the
intent of utilising them along the Northeast passage from North-western Russia
to the markets in Asia.
Illustration, 12 kb.
Plans exist to rebuild military nuclear submarines into civilian oil
tanker submarines for use especially in the development of new oil fields along
the coast of Siberia. The oil tanker submarines would be used in waters
impassable to ordinary oil tankers due to the ice conditions.
Until 1991, Soviet submarine crews were trained at three different training
centres within the Soviet Union: Paldiski in Estonia, Sevastopol in the Ukraine,
and Sosnovy Bor outside St. Petersburg. The training centre in Sevastopol was
the largest of the three and operated highly advanced computer and reactor
simulators, turning out 500 submarine officers a year.[47]
However, ever since the Ukraine achieved independence, the Russian Navy has not
utilised this centre. Of all Soviet specialists and operators of naval reactors,
80 percent of them received their training at the naval college in Sevastopol,
while the remaining 20 percent were trained at the Dzerzhinsky Naval College in
St. Petersburg.[48]
Foto, 41 kb.
Foto, 57 kb.
Many of the Soviet Union's submarine officers were trained at the naval
colleges in Sevastopol (Ukraine) and here at Paldiski (Estonia). Following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, these establishments were closed. At the
present time, work is ongoing in Paldiski to dismantle the two nuclear submarine
models which include the reactors.
Two mock submarines were built in Paldiski, to represent both the first and
second generations (Project 667 BR - Delta-I class and Project 659 - Echo-II
class), and each one had a functional naval reactor installed. The Paldiski
reactors were shut down in 1989 and both the reactors and the mock submarines
are now being dismantled.[49] Officers for the
Project 941-Typhoon class, 667 A - Yankee class and 667 BDRM - Delta I-IV
classes were also trained at Paldiski.[50]
The naval training college in Sosnovy Bor outside St. Petersburg has three
operational experimental reactors very similar to those installed in the nuclear
submarines. Testing of nuclear fuel and the development of naval reactor
technology is carried out here. A fourth research reactor is being built.[51] All training of crews and service personnel for
nuclear submarines now takes place at Dzerzhinsky Naval College in St.
Petersburg. The college has a rather limited capacity, and this has contributed
to an overall reduction in the competence of Russian nuclear submarine crews.
The lack of sufficient funds to keep the nuclear submarine fleet running has
led to present day officers receiving far less training in operational routines
than was the case a few years ago. Furthermore, the deteriorating social
conditions and low wages for officers of the Northern Fleet result in fewer and
fewer of them electing to renew their five year contracts with the navy, and the
heavy turnover of officers reduces the overall level of competence even
further.[52]
The Russian naval officer of today has fallen from being one of the most
privileged members of Soviet society to one whose work is far less valued. The
1990s have brought dramatic changes in the social conditions of the Soviet naval
officer, few of which have been positive. With the severe cuts in the Russian
Navy's budget, special privileges and welfare benefits for navy personnel and
shipyard workers have also been sharply reduced.[53]
The naval shipyards which once worked under state directives, now operate as
independent tax-paying entities who depend on the Navy remunerating the work
that has been commissioned. Some of the ship repair crews have not been paid for
several months.[54] Due to a lack of financing,
much of the former activity has come to a standstill. As a result, the yard
infrastructure is slowly falling apart.[55]
Subsequently, safety levels in the maintenance of both operational as well as
inactive submarines are being compromised. One of the more serious breaches in
safety is the failure to properly maintain the storage facilities for spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet,
Admiral Oleg Yerofeev stated in April 1995 that "the problems of storing
spent nuclear fuel, radioactive waste, inactive submarines and the lack of
servicing for the submarines in active service are a problem not only for the
Northern Fleet, but also for the Russian state. Therefore, it would be natural
not only for the Fleet to take necessary action, but also for the Ministry for
Situations of Emergency, Emercom, also to act. If measures are not taken to
address the situation today, over a period of time the situation could become
critical and lead to an ecological disaster."[56]
The future of the Northern Fleet will largely depend on the development of
military and political events in Russia. Economic and regional developments in
the Arctic region will also affect the fate of the Northern Fleet. Although the
entire build-up of the Northern Fleet was a product of the arms race and the
Cold War, it is improbable that the Northern Fleet would be reduced to 1950
levels, despite the fact that the Cold War has now ended. The new military
doctrine of Russia emphasises that the Northern Fleet's primary mission is to
defend Russian territory.[57]
Assuming that the terms of the START-II treaty are fulfilled, by the year
2003 over 50 percent of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads will be carried on
nuclear submarines as opposed to just under 25 percent today.[58] According to the START-II Treaty, a maximum of 1
750 nuclear warheads may be placed on Russian submarines. This means that the
number of nuclear weapons onboard submarines as a total will decrease, but the
strategic position of the Northern Fleet will be far more important in Russian
nuclear strategy than it is today. According to Russian military experts, the
Russian Navy in the future will need to retain a maximum of 16 strategic nuclear
submarines, 21 attack submarines, and 12 tactical submarines.[59] Western experts maintain that even fewer
submarines will be required.
If the number of permitted strategic nuclear warheads per submarine is
decisive for the number of submarines Russia chooses to maintain in service, the
six Project 941 - Typhoon class submarines in combination with seven submarines
from the Project 667 BDRM - Delta-IV class should prove sufficient. These 13
nuclear submarines can carry 1 750 nuclear warheads between them; however, it
seems unlikely that Russia would choose a defence system based solely upon
strategic nuclear submarines. A new Project 971 - Akula class attack submarine
is scheduled for delivery in 1996.[60]
Furthermore, there are three nuclear submarines of the new Project 885 -
Severodvinsk class currently under construction, a type that can be used both as
a strategic and attack submarine.[61]
The reduction in the number of nuclear warheads as a result of the START-I
and START-II Treaties is shown in the table below. The table also compares the
nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, as well as the
distribution of nuclear warheads on land and at sea:[62]
| Number of Warheads September 1, 1990 |
Number permitted: START-I |
Number permitted: START-II |
| Missile type |
Soviet Union
|
USA |
After 7 years |
After 7 years |
2003 |
| Ballistic missiles |
9.416 |
8.210 |
4.900 |
Not specified
|
|
| Intercontinental missiles |
5.958 |
2.000 |
1.540 |
1.200 |
|
| Submarine launched missiles |
2.804 |
5.760 |
Not specified
|
2.160 |
1.700 - 1.750 |
| Total |
18.178 |
15.970 |
|
|
|
Table 2: The nuclear balance between the USA and Russia.
The future number of strategic submarines in the Northern Fleet will
ultimately depend on the development of the political and economic situation in
Russia.[63]
Some of the largest challenges facing the Russian Navy at this time are the
problems associated with the decommissioning of ageing submarines and the
storage and transport of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. According to
the Russian Ministry of Defence, at the present level of funding it will be
impossible to solve any of these problems. At present, plans exist only on paper
as to how to execute the work through the years 2005-2010.[64] Yet the task of dismantling the force of ageing
submarines must be seen in a much longer perspective. The overhanging danger of
accidents and radioactive leakage from laid up nuclear submarines increases from
year to year, and both from an environmental and economic perspective, it is
important that the decommissioning of nuclear submarines and the securing of
storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is undertaken
quickly. Otherwise, as the technical condition of these vessels and
installations continues to deteriorate, it will become far more expensive to
solve the problems associated with them.[65]
Photo.
Insufficient training of submarine crews can have serious consequences in
the event of an accident. The officer pictured here is being trained in
emergency procedures within the reactor compartment of a Typhoon submarine.
Due
to copyright restraints this photograph is only available in the printed
version. The printed version can be ordered
from us.
Photo.
If the START-II treaty is fulfilled, 50 percent of Russian strategic
nuclear warheads will be places on submarines in 2003. This means that the
Northern Fleet will play an even more important role within the Russian nuclear
strategy. Many of the nuclear missiles will be carried by submarines of the
Delta class, seen in this picture.
Due to copyright restraints this
photograph is only available in the printed version. The printed version can be
ordered from us.
Photo.
LOWERED SOCIAL CONDITIONS: The social conditions for officers of the
Northern Fleet have worsened considerably in the nineties. At times, several
months passes between each pay day. Consequently, the number of officers
renewing their five year contracts with the navy is diminishing. On several
occasions, nuclear submarines on patrol have sailed with fewer qualified
officers than regulations provide. This severely weakens the safety on board.
Due
to copyright restraints this photograph is only available in the printed
version. The printed version can be ordered
from us.
Photo.
TORPEDOES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS: On board the gigantic Typhoon
submarines, a storage room contains torpedoes ready to be armed with nuclear
warheads, to be fired at other submarines in battle. Each Typhoon can carry 18
of these torpedoes.
Due to copyright restraints this photograph is
only available in the printed version. The printed version can be
ordered from us.
Photo.
CLUSTERED TOGETHER IN TIGHT ROWS: At the Naval base Gadzhievo on the Kola
Peninsula, strategic and attack submarines are stationed. During the Cold War
more than 240 nuclear submarines were put to operation within the Soviet Union.
The numbers have been severely reduced during later years; today the Northern
Fleet operates 67 nuclear submarines. The real challenge of today is to ensure
secure demolishing and storage of all the submarines that have been and will be
taken out of operation. The balance of these are today rusting in at the Naval
bases along the Kola coast and in Severodvinsk.
Due to copyright
restraints this photograph is only available in the printed version. The printed
version can be ordered from us.
Photo.
FOR SCRAPPING this officer is painting on the ballistic nuclear missile
from a nuclear submarine. The missiles being taken out of Northern Fleet
submarines are temporarily stored, among other places, here in the Okolnaya bay,
north of Severomorsk. To the right in the background, the simple fence
protecting the nuclear missiles against intruders is discernible. The missiles
are stored out in the open, during the summer as well as the winter. The old
nuclear warheads of these missiles are to be transported to storage facilities
in Siberia.
Due to copyright restraints this photograph is only
available in the printed version. The printed version can be
ordered from us.
Photo.
45 KILOMETRES FROM NORWAY: This is the Northern Fleet nuclear submarine
base situated closest to the Norwegian border. Accidents within the reactors on
board these submarines, or on some of the nuclear waste storage facilities
located in the same fjord, may lead to radioactive contamination reaching the
populations of both the Kola Peninsula and Northern Norway. Civilian Russian
authorities are still not allowed entrance to these military bases to inspect
the nuclear safety.
Due to copyright restraints this photograph is
only available in the printed version. The printed version can be
ordered from us.
[NFL Updated]
[On to nuclear-powered vessels]
[Back to introduction]
[References]
[Content]
[8] Skogan, J. K., Russland og
betydningen av Kola-halvøya i historisk lys , 1992. Return
[9] Osipenko, L., Zhiltsov, L., and Mormul,
N., Atomnaya Podvodnaya Epopeya, 1994. Return
[10] Ibid. Return
[11] Decree no. 570-2011, December 21,
1952, signed by Joseph Stalin in Moscow. Referenced in L. Osipenko, L. Shiltsov,
and N. Mormul, Atomnaya Podvodnaya Epopeya, 1994. Return
[12] Skogan, J. K., The Soviet
Union's Northern Fleet 1968-85, NUPI Report no. 105, 1986.
Return
[13]
Pavlov, A. S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945 -
1995, 1994. Return
[14]
Krasnaya Zvezda, January 28, 1995. Return
[15] Kværner Moss Technology as.,
Disposal of Russian nuclear submarines, January 19. 1996.
Return
[16]
Calculations made from Pavlov, A. S., 1994, and Jane's Fighting Ships
1995-96, 98th edition. Return
[17]
Nevskoye Vremya (St Petersburg), February 22, 1996, and Jane's
Fighting Ships 1995-96, 98th edition Return
[18] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "The Fleet
that we Lost", January 1996. Return
[19] Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide
Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade, 3rd version, May 1995.
Return
[20]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995, interview with
commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Oleg A.Yerofeev.
Return
[21] Office
of Naval Intelligence, World-wide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming
Decade, 3rd version, May 1995. Return
[22] Jane's Defence Weekly, January 3,
1996. Return
[23]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995, interview with
commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Oleg A.Yerofeev.
Return
[24]
Interfax, March 14, 1996. Return
[25] Office of Naval Intelligence, World-wide
Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade, 3rd version, May 1995.
Return
[26]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995, interview with
commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Oleg A.Yerofeev.
Return
[27]
Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-96, 98th edition. Return
[28] Ibid. Return
[29] Jane's Defence Weekly,
November 4, 1995. Return
[30]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995, interview with
commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Oleg A.Yerofeev.
Return
[31]
Murmansky Vestnik, January 5, 1995. Return
[32] Northern Fleet's Press release,
September 22, 1995. Return
[33]
Na Strazhe Zapolyarya, April 19, 1995. Return
[34] Na Strazhe Zapolyarya,
April 19, 1995. Return
[35]
Morskoy Sbornik, no. 6, 1995 and no. 12, 1994. Return
[36] Vladimir Pyzh, Northern Fleet
spokesman to the press, Severomorsk, March 5, 1996. Return
[37] Polyarnaya Pravda,
January 24, 1996. Return
[38]
Polyarnaya Pravda, September 26, 1995. Return
[39] Northern Fleet Press Release,
September 22, 1995. Return
[40]
Radio Murmansk, September 27, 1995. Return
[41] Ibid. Return
[42] Izvestiya, June 3, 1995.
Return
[43]
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, September 14, 1995. Return
[44] Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
April 22, 1995, interview with commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral
Oleg A.Yerofeev. Return
[45]
Sudoexport, Undersea tanker, Moscow 1994. Return
[46] Sudoexport, Undersea transport container carrier,
Moscow 1994. Return
[47]
Morskoy sbornik, No. 1 - 1994. Return
[48] Morskoy sbornik, No. 2 - 1993. Return
[49] Bellona inspection, June 22, 1995.
Return
[50] Ibid.
Return
[51]
The Baltic Region - Our Habitat, E-mail newsletter 1995,
bodorov@glas.apc.org. Return
[52]
Morskoy sbornik, no. 7-1994. Return
[53] Morskoy sbornik, nos. 3, 9, and 12,
1993 and no. 7, 1994. Return
[54]
Na Strazhe Zapolyarya, April 19, 1995. Return
[55] Polyarnaya Pravda,
February 28, 1995. Return
[56]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995, interview with
commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Oleg A.Yerofeev.
Return
[57] Ibid.
Return
[58] Office
of Naval Intelligence, World-wide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming
Decade, 3rd version, May 1995. Return
[59] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995,
interview with commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Oleg
A.YerofeOCOCev. Return
[60]
Severny Rabochy, January 19, 1995. Return
[61] Jane's Fighting Ships
1995-96, 98th edition. Return
[62]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 10, 1996. Return
[63] Krasnaya Zvezda, April
15, 1995. Return
[64]
Murmansky Vestnik, March 15, 1995. Return
[65] Krasnaya Zvezda, July
13, 1995. Return
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